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The build cycle of a first in class combat ship takes about six years.  
During that timeframe systems are being designed, installed and tested, but until 
the ship is in the water and tested at sea trials it is not known if the ship is fully 
integrated and will actually perform as it is designed to do.  As time progresses 
integration problems become harder and more expensive to solve.  Every time a 
new system is added or upgraded there may be interference from another 
system that was not anticipated.  It is important to test and verify each system but 
there is limited time and resources to do so.  By successfully planning and 
performing systems integration at the correct time of the acquisition cycle it is 
possible to reduce the chance of system failure.  The objective of this thesis is to 
explain and establish the process of building a fully integrated combat ship. 
To understand how to perform integration first we must define what it 
means to our customer, the Navy, and us, the shipbuilder.  This is accomplished 
in the first chapter.  The second chapter concentrates on why we need to perform 
system integration by explaining the history of the U.S. Navy’s shipbuilding 
program and case studies of successful and not as successful integrated 
systems.  The last chapter contains a list of concepts and ideas to implement into 
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I. INTEGRATION CHARACTERIZATION 
A. INTRODUCTION 
Ships are essentially floating cities, and combat ships add the complexity 
of war fighting capabilities to their mission.  Of all the equipment Congress 
purchases for the military, only ships are in the category of Capital equipment.  
This means that the equipment has a large dollar value and therefore special 
oversight.  Shipbuilding continues to be a very labor-intensive industry that relies 
mainly on past performance and experience to measure progress to completion.  
As our systems become even more complex, the old “rules of thumb” for 
designing and building a successful working ship may not apply. 
The build cycle of a first in class combat ship takes about six years.  
During that timeframe, systems are being designed, installed, and tested, but 
until the ship is in the water and tested at sea trials it is not known if the ship is 
fully integrated and will actually perform as designed.  As time progresses 
integration problems become harder and more expensive to solve.  Every time a 
new system is added or upgraded there may be interference from another 
system that was not anticipated.  It is important to test and verify each system, 
but there is limited time and resources to do so.  By successfully planning and 
performing systems integration at the correct time of the acquisition cycle, it is 
possible to reduce the chance of system failure.  The objective of this thesis is to 
explain and establish the process of building a fully integrated combat ship. 
To understand how to perform integration, first we must define what it 
means to our customer, the Navy, and us, the shipbuilder.  This is accomplished 
in the first chapter.  The second chapter concentrates on why we need to perform 
system integration by explaining the history of the U.S. Navy’s shipbuilding 
program and case studies of successful and not as successful integrated 
systems.  The last chapter contains concepts and ideas to implement into a 
combat ship design and build program to simplify shipbuilding integration.   
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To properly place systems integration into the acquisition cycle, the thesis 
begins with defining systems engineering. 
 
B. DEFINING SYSTEMS ENGINEERING 
Systems engineering is not a field that is as clear cut as many of the other 
engineering disciplines, but systems engineering is rather young compared to 
traditional engineering disciplines, such as civil, mechanical, and electrical 
engineering.  It may be due to its age that it’s hard to define systems 
engineering, but defining of a field of study that does not have any real tangible 
product will always be hard to explain to people, especially engineers.  First, the 
paper will discuss the International Council on Systems Engineering’s definition 
and then the Department of Defense’s definition, and then compare the two 
explanations. 
1. International Council on Systems Engineering Definition 
The International Council on Systems Engineering has worked for years to 
create a concise definition of systems engineering.  Founded in 1990, the 
“International Council on Systems Engineering is an international authoritative 
body promoting the application of an interdisciplinary approach and means to 
enable the realization of successful systems.”  (“A Consensus of the INCOSE 
Fellows,” 2004)  I find their definition to be very exact and understandable: 
Systems Engineering is an interdisciplinary approach and means to 
enable the realization of successful systems.  It focuses on defining 
customer needs and required functionality early in the development 
cycle, documenting requirements, then proceeding with design 






Cost and Schedule 
Training and Support 
Disposal 
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Systems Engineering integrates all the disciplines and specialty 
groups into a team effort forming a structured development process 
that proceeds from concept to production to operation. Systems 
Engineering considers both the business and the technical needs of 
all customers with the goal of providing a quality product that meets 
the user needs. (INCOSE website, 2005) 
By taking the definition and decomposing it we can see where integration 
fits into the systems engineering definition.   
Systems Engineering is an interdisciplinary approach and means to 
enable the realization of successful systems. (INCOSE website, 
2005) 
This is the overall goal of systems engineering: to create a successful 
system; not just a system, but a successful one.  That means looking and 
analyzing the customer’s needs and requirements and ensuring that what the 
customer is asking for actually fits their needs.  They could have stopped here, 
but then the definition would not have told us what systems engineers do. 
It focuses on defining customer needs and required functionality 
early in the development cycle, documenting requirements, then 
proceeding with design synthesis and system validation while 





Cost and Schedule 
Training and Support 
Disposal (INCOSE website, 2005) 
The first part of the sentence explains how systems engineers take the 
customer requirements and break them into groups so that design engineers can 
design their part of the system.  With the increasing complexity of system design, 
boundaries must be drawn for the work to be performed correctly.  When the 
systems engineer breaks the system down into these workable chunks they pass 
along to the design engineer how the seven items listed need to be considered in 
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the design.  By doing this the design engineers can focus on their part of the 
problem and are not distracted by other parts of the problem.  Requirements 
keep designers focused on the problem they have been given responsibility to 
solve. 
Systems Engineering integrates all the disciplines and specialty 
groups into a team effort forming a structured development process 
that proceeds from concept to production to operation. (INCOSE 
website, 2005)  
This part of the definition concentrates on integration.  It is this part of the 
definition on which this thesis is focused.  Once the system has been 
decomposed for design purposes to obtain a buildable and usable system it must 
be merged back together.  This is the integration phase of the design process. 
Systems Engineering considers both the business and the technical 
needs of all customers with the goal of providing a quality product 
that meets the user needs. (INCOSE website, 2005) 
The last sentence is a wrap up of what was said in the first sentence, 
making note that systems engineering focuses on business and technical needs.  
The systems engineers are responsible for making certain that the customer 
receives what they need and can afford.  
2. Department of Defense Definition 
Because this paper is focused on building U.S. Navy ships we will explore 
the definition the Department of Defense has for systems engineering.  It should 
be noted that the Department of Defense definition is created not for the builder 
of system, but the program managers and defense employees acquiring the 
system.  From the Defense Acquisition Guidebook (2005): 
Systems engineering is the overarching process that a program 
team applies to transition from a stated capability need to an 
operationally effective and suitable system.  Systems engineering 
encompasses the application of systems engineering processes 
across the acquisition life cycle (adapted to each and every phase) 
and is intended to be the integrating mechanism for balanced 
solutions addressing capability needs, design considerations and 
constraints, as well as limitations imposed by technology, budget,  
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and schedule.  The systems engineering processes are applied 
early in concept definition, and then continuously throughout the 
total life cycle. (Chap. 4.0) 
As done previously with the International Council on Systems Engineering 
definition, we will separate and analyze the definition.  The first sentence: 
Systems engineering is the overarching process that a program 
team applies to transition from a stated capability need to an 
operationally effective and suitable system. (Defense Acquisition 
Guidebook, 2005, Chap. 4.0) 
What is being described is that a process is used to get from customer 
needs to a workable system.  It’s said in a different way, but the International 
Council on Systems Engineering definition covers this point.  There is not the 
emphasis on providing the customer with what they need versus what they ask 
for with this definition.  It is assumed that the “stated capability” has already been 
judged as achievable by the government. 
Systems engineering encompasses the application of systems 
engineering processes across the acquisition life cycle (adapted to 
each and every phase) and is intended to be the integrating 
mechanism for balanced solutions addressing capability needs, 
design considerations and constraints, as well as limitations 
imposed by technology, budget, and schedule. (Defense 
Acquisition Guidebook, 2005, Chap. 4.0) 
Here is the point where integrating is mentioned in the definition.  
Department of Defense has a shorter list than the International Council on 
Systems Engineering, leaving out manufacturing, test, disposal, etc but 
essentially says that systems engineering should be used through out the entire 
acquisition life cycle which one could say includes those items left out of the 
Department of Defense definition.  The Department of Defense states that 
systems engineering is the “mechanism” for how the parts are integrated for the 
overall system.  This implies that systems integration is a part of systems 
engineering process and therefore not at the same level. 
And then the last sentence:  “The systems engineering processes are 
applied early in concept definition, and then continuously throughout the total life 
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cycle,” (Defense Acquisition Guidebook, 2005, Chap. 4.0) reemphasizing that 
systems engineering is to be used throughout the entire acquisition cycle. 
3. Key Points of Systems Engineering Definitions 
I chose to use two definitions for explaining systems engineering: the 
International Council on Systems Engineering definition because it is a very 
concise yet broad definition that concentrates on the system engineer designing 
and building the system, and the Department of Defense definition because the 
customer of United States Navy warships is the Department of Defense. 
Table 1 summarizes the key points each definition makes about a three 
main topics.  
 
KEY POINT INTERNATIONAL COUNCIL 
ON SYSTEMS ENGINEERING 
DEPARTMENT OF 
DEFENSE 
Goal of SE Create a successful system that 
meets technical and business 
customer needs. 
Create an operationally 
effective and suitable system.





Brings together people with 
different specialties. 
Described as the “balancing 
mechanism.” 
Table 1: Key Points of Systems Engineering Definition (after INCOSE 
website, 2005 and Defense Acquisition Guidebook, 2005, Chap. 4.0) 
 
The International Council on Systems Engineering has a broader focus on 
commercial applications, while the Department of Defense centers on products 
used by the military.  For this reason the goals are different. The International 
Council on Systems Engineering’s goal is to create a successful system, while 
the Department of Defense wants a system that is effective and suitable in the 
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environment it was created to fight in.  In the commercial world success is 
measured by profits, but in the Department of Defense world success is 
measured in the ability to save our soldier’s lives and protect our country.   
The timeframe is longer for the Department of Defense to include the 
disposal cycle because lifecycle issues are generally not as important in 
commercial applications as they are with the Department of Defense.  Ships are 
normally kept in service for thirty years.  Trying to lower the costs associated with 
operating ships is very important to the United States Navy. 
Systems Integration is mentioned in both definitions, but with different 
explanations.  The International Council on Systems Engineering concentrates 
more on the idea of bringing together different ideas and backgrounds to create a 
product.  The International Council on Systems Engineering centers on a people 
oriented tasks.  The Department of Defense uses integrating to mean how the 
product is balanced across cost, schedule, and performance.  The definitions 
want the same outcome, but the Department of Defense centers on the program 
metrics of cost, schedule, and performance.  Those items are important in the 
commercial world too, but those are constraints commercial firms always have to 
consider.  The Department of Defense has been evolving from a time where the 
most important consideration was performance, then schedule, and cost was the 
least important.  Now the Department of Defense faces more public scrutiny on 
how the defense budget is spent and must change the way their systems are 
procured.  This is the reason for the different emphasizes in the definitions 
between the International Council on Systems Engineering and the Department 
of Defense. 
4. Author’s Synopsis of Systems Engineering Definition 
My personal explanation and purpose of systems engineering is “to bring 
order to chaos.”  We have reached a period of time where products or systems 
are so complex that a small group of designers can no longer understand every 
part of the system.  When the ability to understand every detail and make it 
whole with a manageable group of people was lost, systems engineering as a  
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separate field of practice became necessary.  For this reason it is my belief that it 
is not a question of whether systems engineering exists or not, but if it is good or 
bad systems engineering.   
Systems engineering should not necessarily deliver to the customer what 
they initially request.  There is an important distinction here in that just because 
the customer says they want a certain feature that feature may not be needed to 
achieve the overall goal of the system or it could be unrealistic for the amount of 
money and time that it would take the contractor to develop.  It is the systems 
engineer’s responsibility to educate the customer on these issues. 
 
C. DEFINING SYSTEMS INTEGRATION 
Systems engineering is the process that creates an environment in which 
the system can be designed.  It provides the clear path forward to each design 
engineer.  Systems integration is the part of that process that brings back 
together what has been separated out for design purposes.  First the paper will 
discuss the Department of Defense’s definition of systems integration and then 
explain what it means to the shipbuilder. 
1. Department of Defense’s Definition of Systems Integration 
Systems integration is a part of systems engineering and systems 
engineering by Department of Defense rules is suppose to occur throughout the 
entire acquisition cycle.  The Department of Defense places integration in the Life 
Cycle Management Framework in Figure 1 as the first part of the System 
Development and Demonstration Phase located between Milestone B and C.
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Figure 1.   Integrated Defense Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics Life Cycle Management Framework (from 
http://akss.dau.mil/dapc/index.html)
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See Figure 2 for a simpler view of the phases and milestones.  The figure 
is from 2003, but the phases have remained the same. This phase was added in 
October 2000.  (Dillard, 2003, p. 33)  In that phase are two sub phases, System 
Integration and System Demonstration.  
 
Figure 2.   Simplified Defense Acquisition Management Framework (from 
Dillard, 2003, p. 36) 
 
System Integration falls between Milestone B and Design Readiness 
Review (DRR).  Milestone B marks the end of the Technology Development 
Phase.  “The Technology Development Phase ends when the Milestone Decision 
Authority determines that technologies are sufficiently mature.  This 
determination, along with the satisfaction of other statutory and regulatory 
requirements, supports program initiation.” (Defense Acquisition Guidebook, 
2005, Chap. 2.2.1)  This tells us that the concept design must be mature enough 
to proceed to being the System Integration sub phase.  It is important to note 
here that what the Department of Defense considers as integration is not the 
same thing that the builder of the system would call integration.  This statement 
will be expounded in Section 3, author’s synopsis of systems integration 
definition. 
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Figure 3 displays the model used by Department of Defense to display the 
tasks required for the phase.  System Integration is the downward part of the “v” 
and System Demonstration is the upward part of the “v.”   
 
Figure 3.   Department of Defense SDD Model (from Defense Acquisition 
Guidebook, 2005, Chap. 4.3.3.3) 
 
To finish the System Integration sub phase is the DRR event.  From the 
Defense Acquisition Guidebook:   
The Design Readiness Review during SDD provides an opportunity 
for mid-phase assessment of design maturity as evidenced by 
measures such as the number of subsystem and system design 
reviews successfully completed; the percentage of drawings 
completed; planned corrective actions to hardware/software 
deficiencies; adequate development testing; an assessment of 
environment, safety and occupational health risks; a completed 
failure modes and effects analysis; the identification of key system 
characteristics and critical manufacturing processes; an estimate of 
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system reliability based on demonstrated reliability rates; etc. 
Successful completion of the Design Readiness Review ends 
System Integration and continues the SDD phase into the System 
Demonstration effort. MDAs may, consistent with the intent of this 
paragraph, determine the form and content of the review. (Defense 
Acquisition Guidebook, 2005, Chap. 3.7.4) 
This means that before the system integration sub phase the concept 
design should be mature, but production does not begin until after the system 
integration sub phase.  This places system integration for the Department of 
Defense between requirements development and production.   
2. Systems Integration Sub Phase 
In the Technology Development Phase the design engineers have taken 
their requirements provided by the system engineers and designed a product that 
meets those requirements.  But in the System Integration sub phase the 
engineers gather together and review with each other various parts of the design. 
Dillard (2003) defines the task of the system integration phase “for the reduction 
of integration risk.  The architecture is complete, now system integration is 
applied to demonstrated subsystems and components.”  (p. 33) The Defense 
Acquisition Guidebook (2005) describes the Systems Integration phase as 
follows: 
The System Integration work effort begins when the program 
manager has a technical solution for the system or increment of 
capability, but has not integrated the components and subsystems 
into a system.  Through the use of systems engineering, the 
System Integration effort integrates components and subsystems, 
completes the detailed design, and reduces system level risk.  The 
effort typically includes the demonstration of prototype articles or 
engineering development models. (Chap. 4.3.3.2) 
The easiest way to explain this is to take an example.   
A combat ship for the U.S. Navy has a performance requirement to have a 
maximum ship speed of 30 knots.  First the system engineer splits and assigns 
the requirement to the naval architects, the power engineers, and control 
engineers if they expect to use software to control the equipment.  The naval 
architects create a hull form that is capable of reaching 30 knots, the power 
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engineers size the engine to provide enough power to go 30 knots, and the 
control engineers write software to manage the associated equipment.  See 
Figure 4 for the decomposition of the requirement.  Each sub-box represents a 
group of engineers performing their part of the requirement.  The split of work is 
divided and each group of engineers is responsible for meeting their part of the 
requirement.  This is the point where systems integration gets started. 
Figure 4.   Example Requirement Decomposition 
 
Does the engine the power engineers chose fit in the hull form the naval 
architects designed?  Can production install it?  Will the combination of the hull 
form and engine be structurally sound?  Can the control system support going 30 
knots within given safety parameters?  None of these issues have been 
addressed at this stage.  These and lots of other questions are addressed in the 
system integration sub phase when creating the design and build specifications.  
It is here that the constraints each engineering group put on the other groups is 
documented.  For this reason the Department of Defense calls this sub phase 
“System Integration.” 
In Figure 5 you see the model from the left hand side or Integration part of 
the SDD Phase.  Now we will analyze each box separately.  Note that every  
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program under the Department of Defense does not follow these steps entirely 


















Figure 5.   DoD Integration Model (after Lifecycle Model) 
 
a. Inputs 
At the completion of Milestone B you should have the documents 
listed below.  The maturity of these documents directly affects the maturity of the 
system design.  
• System Performance Specs 
Interpret User Needs, 
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• Exit Criteria 
• Validated System Support and Maintenance Objectives and 
Requirements 
• Acquisition Program Baseline (APB) 
• Capability Development Document (CDD) 
• Systems Engineering Plan (SEP) 
• Information Support Plan (ISP) 
• Test and Evaluation Master Plan (TEMP)  
• Product Support Strategy (Defense Acquisition Guidebook, 2005, 
Chap. 4.3.3.1) 
b. Refine System Performance  
From the inputs you refine the system performance.  The user 
needs are updated and finalized as Key Performance Parameters in the 
Capability Development Document.  Key Performance Parameters can be 
changed after this phase, but such change requires approval authority.  The 
design needs to be relatively stable at this point to keep costs under control.  The 
design spiral of developing the systems should be stopped to successfully spend 
the time on getting the subsystems to function together.  With the release of the 
Capability Development Document the System Performance Specifications are 
updated to include the new or modified requirements.  Any additional 
environmental constraints are addressed at this time.  At the end of this phase 
you have your System Requirements Review. (Defense Acquisition Guidebook, 
2005, Chap. 4.3.3.3.1) 
c. Functional Requirements 
From the updated System Performance Specification you develop 
System Functional Specifications and the System Verification Plan.  As you do 
this you look back at your performance specifications and perform trade-offs 
between subsystems.  Requirements that conflict or have the potential for 
exceeding cost are analyzed and changed if necessary.  Here is where the 
integration of the subsystems begins.  Interfaces between the subsystems are 
identified and integration requirements are developed.  The System Verification 
Plan is developed and demonstrates how each requirement will be verified.  As 
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the requirements are added and modified the path to verification is recorded in 
the database with the requirement.  This phase ends with the System Functional 
Review. (Defense Acquisition Guidebook, 2005, Chap. 4.3.3.3.2) 
d. Design to Requirements 
After finalizing your functional requirements you begin to create 
design to requirements.  This set of specifications is what will be used to perform 
detail design of the system.  The Configuration Item Verification Plan is created 
to show how the design requirements will be met.  This phase ends with the 
Preliminary Design Review. (Defense Acquisition Guidebook, 2005, Chap. 
4.3.3.3.3) 
e. Build to Requirements 
After finalizing your design to requirements you begin to create 
build to requirements.  This set of specifications is what will be used to perform 
actual construction of the system.  The Inspection Plan is created to show how 
the product will be checked against the design and build to documentation.  The 
last review in the System Integration phase is the Critical Design Review. 
(Defense Acquisition Guidebook, 2005, Chap. 4.3.3.3.4) 
3. Shipyard Definition of Integration 
As stated earlier in this thesis is the idea that the shipyard’s, or 
shipbuilder’s, concept of integration is different than the Department of Defense’s 
definition.  This is because the two groups have different vantage points on the 
process.  It is the Department of Defense’s job to explain and document to the 
shipbuilder the soldiers’ wants and needs.  The formal requirements instantiate 
these wants and needs.  Once the build to specifications are approved and the 
inspection plan is created the Department of Defense uses those documents to 
govern and status the progress.  But for the shipbuilder only the integration 
planning and concepts have been defined.  Integration will not take affect until 
production is done. 
Going back to the example used in Section 2 on the power requirement 
we can explain the shipbuilder’s point of view on integration of this requirement.  
As stated earlier the Department of Defense uses the definition of Systems 
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Integration to be when the build to specifications are completed.  The shipbuilder  
will not know if the integration effort was successful until the ship is tested during 












Figure 6.   Basic Vee Model (from Forsberg, Mooz, and Cotterman, 2000, p. 
116) 
 
Forsberg, Mooz, and Cotterman in “Visualizing Project Management” 
define integration as “combining entities to prove performance and compatibly.”  
(p.115) Proving performance and compatibly is done through testing and 
verification.   
Figure 6 is taken from “Visualizing Project Management.”  The downward 
side, which Forsberg, Mooz, and Cotterman call “Decomposition and Definition” 
contains essentially the same steps discussed in the Department of Defense’s 
model which was called Systems Integration.  The upward side of the vee is 
labeled “Integration and Verification” by Forsberg, Mooz, and Cotterman.  (p. 
115) The Department of Defense calls this part of the process the System 
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Demonstration side.  An important point here is that the Department of Defense 
and Forsberg, Mooz, and Cotterman are performing the same tasks in their 
respective models, but have different names for the steps.   
Barker (2000) in “Here Be Dragons, An Integration Shopping List” defines 
integration as “a complex system of problems, rather than a single complex 
problem.” (p. 284)  The Department of Defense labels Systems Integration as the 
planning stage for those problems, but the shipbuilder sees integration as the 
problems to be solved after the final stages of testing as defined by the 
subsystem tests.   
4. Author’s Synopsis of Systems Integration Definition 
Systems integration is performed to verify that the system performs as 
required in the System Performance Specifications.  Testing is done to assure 
that the requirements in the build to specifications are met, but the system is not 
fully integrated until the performance is assured.  Because there are so many 
different parts that pertain to just one area of performance, systems integration is 
a very complicated problem.   
System integration takes people.  A piece of software can be written to 
perform the task, but a person must define how the task will be performed.  How 
the pieces fit together and work is purely a human task. 
The key to systems integration is not just answering the questions you 
know to ask, but discovering what is not being asked!  There are things that can 
be done to ease the integration of complex systems, but to say that if you do all 
of these things integration will not be a problem is impossible.   
It is in everyone’s best interest to find all of the mismatches before 
production or operation begin.  As everyone knows, fixing a design issue on 
paper is a lot easier and cheaper than when the system has been built.  You can 
argue that the effort isn’t worth the trouble; you can spend lots of money working 
integration and not have any guarantee that the integration issues have been 
solved as mentioned in the paragraph above. So why even try?  The reason is 
this:  in shipbuilding real prototypes do not exist.  The first of a class of ships will 
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be used in service; ships are too expensive to build and then discard without 
being put into service.  It is potential cost avoidance in other programs, but it’s 
necessary in shipbuilding.  This thesis is postulating that a good plan needs to be 
established during the requirements definition phase, what the Department of 
Defense calls “System Integration” to facilitate production design and 
construction.  One the plan is developed and implemented it should be revisited 
and adjusted with the idea in mind to continue to reach towards meeting the 
performance requirements within the cost and schedule constraints.  The next 
chapter fully presents the reasons why systems integration is more necessary 
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II. IMPORTANCE OF SYSTEM INTEGRATION 
A. INTRODUCTION 
When making a change in the way business is done it’s best to start with 
asking if a change is needed.  This paper is proposing that a change in the 
shipbuilding industry is necessary to develop and build the combat ships of the 
future.  First this chapter will describe the cost of change by using the learning 
curve theory. Then this chapter will explore where we are in history by comparing 
the differences in shipbuilding from the past to the present using two shipbuilding 
case studies.  The comparison of these case studies will demonstrate the 
increasing degree of complexity with integrating a first of class ship in today’s 
world versus the past.  Next the paper will discuss a successful integrated 
system and a failure to demonstrate the consequences of either performing or 
not performing systems integration correctly. 
 
B. LEARNING CURVE THEORY 
The reality is that change comes with a price.  Learning curve theory 
shows that you pay for change upfront.  “As experience is gained with the 
production of a particular product, either by a single worker or by an industry as a 
whole, the production becomes more efficient.” (Nahmias, 2000, p. 32)  
Shipbuilding is an industry that uses and follows the trend of learning curves.  
The more ships we build, the cheaper we can build them.  Shipbuilders often do 
not plan to make money off of the first ship of the class, knowing that as their 
workforce becomes more experienced with the hull the cost of production will 
decrease.  If you make a change the learning curve goes back up, and the hope 
is that you end up below the original learning curve.  See Figure 7 for an example 
of what a learning curve may look like after implementing a major change.  
The same can be said about the design process for building ships.  Ships 
have been built for over 2000 years; this is not a new concept.  Shipyards are 
filled with shipbuilders that understand the processes they use.  Shipbuilding is 
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not like designing and building anything else in the product market.  Changing a 
shipbuilding process runs a high risk of being more expensive due to the fact of 
all the other changes that can snowball into that one change.  It is with this 















Figure 7.   Learning Curve Example 
 
C. USS CONSTITUTION 
1. Introduction 
The USS Constitution is the oldest commissioned warship in the U.S. 
Navy.  It is docked in Boston, MA and is over 200 years old.  It is a wooden ship 
























Figure 8.   USS Constitution (from http://www.ussconstitution.navy.mil) 
 
2. Acquisition Strategy 
At the end of the Revolutionary War United States merchants were 
unprotected in the ocean from pirates.  During the war the country had a 
Continental Navy, but the cost of maintenance of even one frigate was too 
expensive for the moneyless nation.  The last frigate was sold in 1785.  (Martin, 
2005, p. 11) Thomas Jefferson, then Secretary of State recommended three 
solutions to the pirate problem:  
1. Insure cargos, ransom prisoners regularly at a fixed rate, and 
conduct commerce as usual,  
2. Buy safe conduct with tribute, as many European nations did, or  
3. Fight.  (p. 12) 
Congress decided that paying ransoms was cheaper than creating a navy.  
But eventually the overwhelming activity of the pirates caused Congress to 
change their mind.  By 1794 Congress passed a resolution that provided a naval 
force sufficient to protect American merchantmen from pirates.  Congress 
appropriated $600K for the purchase of six frigate type ships, a very optimistic 
price. (p. 13) 
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A competition was not held for the design.  Joshua Humphreys was an 
established shipbuilder in Philadelphia and had been asked for quotes while the 
Secretary of Defense was gathering information on how much it would cost to 
build the frigates and he quite simply wanted the job and went after it.  
Humphreys designed a ship that was fast, powerful, heavily armored and could 
operate independently just about anywhere in the world.  The plans for the ship 
were located on one sheet of paper with two views.  See Figure 9.  This sheet 
and the list of materials was all that was used to build the Navy’s first frigates. 
(pp. 24-25) 
To build the six ships six sites were chosen.  Congress recognized that 
using one or two shipyards would reduce the cost, but they wanted to broaden 
the country’s shipbuilding experience and hopefully procure the ships faster.  The 
shipyards were chosen based on their experience during the Revolutionary War 
and politicians and businessmen’s recommendations. (p. 43) 
 
Figure 9.   USS Constitution Construction Drawing (from 
http://www.ussconstitution.navy.mil) 
 
Shipyards in Portsmouth (New Hampshire), Boston, New York, 
Philadelphia, Baltimore, and Gosport (Portsmouth), Virginia were given a 
contract to build the ships three weeks after President Washington signed the 
bill.  Secretary Knox appointed four men per shipyard to oversee the construction 
of the frigates for the government.  (Martin, 1997, p. 43) 
In March 1796 an Algerine peace treaty was signed.  The act that 
authorized the construction of the ships could be cancelled since the pirates were 
no longer a threat, but President Washington and Congress decided that the loss 
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of work for all the men involved in the construction of the ships would not be in 
the best public interest, so it was decided to continue with the original contract 
but to build three ships and suspend construction on the other three. (p. 61) 
With the suspension of the three ships material for those ships was sent to 
the ships remaining under construction.  Even with the extra material 
approximately $100,000 of extra money was estimated to complete the three 
ships.  This money was appropriated March 1797, an hour within the end of 
Washington’s term for president. (p. 67) 
The USS United States was the first ship launched, followed by the USS 
Constellation.  The USS Constitution was being built in Boston and was launched 
last in October 1797.  Anyone familiar with shipbuilding knows that the launching 
of the ship does not mean construction is finished.  Launching of the USS 
Constitution was done once the ship was “ship-shape,” that is a floatable vessel, 
but not outfitted for use. (p. 84) 
By the time the USS Constitution was launched the United States was 
starting to see “free trade upon the high seas” affected by the “belligerents in 
Europe, Britain and France.”  Pirates were no longer the main concern. (p. 89)  
In January 1798 the Secretary of War asked Congress for an additional 
$400,000 to finish the construction of the ships and other naval matters.  (p. 89)  
The USS Constitution was finally ready for sea July 1798.  (p. 98) 
3. Cost and Schedule 
It took over four years to build the USS Constitution.  Initially $115,000 
had been appropriated to construct the ship.  The final bill was $302,719.  That 
amounts to a cost overrun of 260%.  (pp. 98-100) 
The Secretary of War, McHenry, was asked to explain the cost overrun.  
He listed five causes: 
1. Building the ships in different places 
2. Size of the ships 
3. Quantity of live oak used in construction 
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4. Rise of material and labor costs 
5. Certain losses and contingences (p. 100) 
The choice to build the ships at different yards certainly increased the 
cost, but the country needed the ships as quickly as possible.  The ships were 
upgraded to “super frigates” from the normally armed frigates of standard 
construction.  Live oak was used in lieu of white oak, which proved to be more 
difficult to procure.  Labor and material costs rose. For example in Philadelphia 
from the date of the first estimate to launch labor increased by 40%.  Then things 
just happened, like a fire that burned about fifty tons of hemp in Boston. (p. 100) 
McHenry concluded his report with the following thought: 
The great delay that has occurred in the present undertaking must 
always be more or less experienced, when heavy ships of war are 
required to be suddenly built, and the Government not previously 
possessed of the necessary time and materials. It is certainly an 
unfit time to look for these, and prepare a navy yard, when the 
ships are required for actual service. . .  (p. 101) 
McHenry’s point is that it is not feasible to attempt to start a new 
shipbuilding design and construction contract at the time you need the ships.  
Warships require a massive amount of planning and time.  But this is bound to 




The DD(X) is the newest and most technically advanced shipbuilding 
program untaken by the U.S. Navy today.  It is designed to be undetectable by 
our enemies and uses electrical drive to power and move the ship.  (“DD(X),” 
2005) 
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2. Acquisition Strategy 
DD(X) was first conceptionalized as DD-21 under the Navy’s vision of 
“Forward. . . From the Sea” in 1994.  The ship was intended to replace the DD 
963 and FFG 7 Classes of Destroyer and Frigate in the fleet today. (“DD-21 
Zumwalt,” 2000)   
The Land-Attack Destroyer (DD-21) is the first surface combatant 
founded entirely upon post-Cold War thinking and strategic 
concepts. Accordingly, the DD-21 design concept will support joint-
service requirements in littoral regions. Armed with an array of land-
attack weapons, DD-21 will provide sustained, offensive, 
distributed, and precise firepower at long ranges in support of 
forces ashore. With state-of-the-art information technologies, DD-
21 will operate seamlessly with other naval, ground, and land-
based air forces, and will be in accordance with the Navy's evolving 
"Network-Centric Warfare" concept of operations and IT-21 
(Information Technology for the 21st Century) architecture. 
(http://www.metsci.com)   
The Mission Need Statement (MNS) was released June 1995.  (“DD-21 
Zumwalt.” 2000)  See Figure 10 for an artistic rendering of DD 21. 
 
Figure 10.   DD 21 Artistic Render (from “DD-21 Zumwalt,” 2000) 
 
The DD 21 Program passed Milestone I January 1998 and released the 
formal solicitation in March 1998.  DD 21 was developed under the 1996 
Department of Defense Acquisition Model (See Figure 11).  The first ship was to 
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be awarded in 2004 and the Navy planned to buy 32 ship total at a rate of 3 per 
year.  See Figure 12 for a view of the technologies planned for DD 21.  The ship 
was expected to cost $750M per ship in FY96 dollars by the fifth constructed 
ship.  The plan was for two teams to compete for the design and build of the DD 
21 Class Ships, but both shipyards would share in the design and construction of 
the ships themselves with the loser being the “follow’ shipyard.  Only one 
Systems Integrator would be selected.  (“DD-21 Zumwalt,” 2000) 
 
Figure 11.   1996 Defense Systems Acquisition Management Process (from 




Figure 12.   New Technologies of DD 21 (from “DD-21 Zumwalt,” 2000) 
 
Then the events of September 11, 2001 changed all of the military’s 
strategic planning for the future.  (“SeaPower21,” 2002)  In November 2001 the 
Department of Defense announced that the DD 21 Program had been revised 
and would now be known as DD(X).  With the new program name the acquisition 
management cycle was updated to the 2000 version. (See Figure 13.)  The major 
difference between the original cycle and the new one was the addition of the 
System Development and Demonstration Phase (SDD).  In April 2002 the Navy 
awarded the DD(X) contract to Northrop Grumman and Raytheon with General 
Dynamics Bath Iron Works as the follow shipyard.  (“DD(X),” 2005)  Sea Power 
21 was released later that year and DD(X)’s mission was realigned with Sea 
Power 21.  See Figure 14 for Sea Power 21 visual.  Admiral Clark wrote of the 
Sea Power 21 vision:  
The 21st century sets the stage for tremendous increases in naval 
precision, reach, and connectivity, ushering in a new era of joint 
operational effectiveness. Innovative concepts and technologies will 
integrate sea, land, air, space, and cyberspace to a greater extent 
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than ever before. In this unified battlespace, the sea will provide a 
vast maneuver area from which to project direct and decisive power 
around the globe. (“SeaPower21,” 2002) 
 
Figure 13.   2000 Defense Systems Acquisition Management Process (from 




Figure 14.   Sea Power 21 (from “SeaPower21,” 2002) 
 
The nation’s military focused on terrorism, reacting to protect our 
homeland.  Admiral Clark described the dangers as follows: 
These dangers will produce frequent crises, often with little warning 
of timing, size, location, or intensity. Associated threats will be 
varied and deadly, including weapons of mass destruction, 
conventional warfare, and widespread terrorism. Future enemies 
will attempt to deny us access to critical areas of the world, threaten 
vital friends and interests overseas, and even try to conduct further 
attacks against the American homeland. These threats will pose 
increasingly complex challenges to national security and future 
warfighting. (“SeaPower21,” 2002) 
In the past the nation focused on certain countries and regions as our 
enemies.  With the events of September 11th we needed to focus more broadly 
across the world.  (“SeaPower21,” 2002) 
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The major changes to DD(X) included a reduction of weight.  DD 21 was 
expected to be a 14,000 ton ship and DD(X) was reduced to 12,000 tons.  Crew 
size for DD 21 was aimed at 95, but DD(X) increased that number.  The radar 
system was changed from Multi-function radar to Dual Band radar.  Thirty-two 
ships were expected to be built under DD 21, but the DD(X) Program reduced 
the number to anywhere from eight to twelve.  First ship delivery was pushed 
back from 2008 to 2011.  (“DD(X),” 2005) See Figure 15 for a summary of the 
new technologies on DD(X). 
 
 
Figure 15.   DD(X) New Technologies (from “DD(X),” 2005) 
 
In February 2005 the Navy announced a change in its acquisition strategy 
for DD(X).  This was due to the FY 2006 President’s budget proposal containing 
only five DD(X)’s.  Procurement would start in 2006 and one ship would be built 
each year.  After months of trying to estimate the cost of the ship into the amount 
the Navy had appropriated for the first ship, the Navy decided to try to save some 
money by having the ships built at one shipyard instead of two. (“DD(X) to Go to 
a Single Yard?,” 2005)  This plan was rejected in April by Congress due to 
political pressure from the states of the two shipyards.   
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The Senate put more money than the President’s Budget proposed into 
the DD(X) Program and the House reduced the amount of money.  In June 2005 
the DD(X) program had a successful 06 level Critical Design Review (CDR.)  In 
November 2005 the Pentagon decided to allow the program to proceed into 
detail design and construction.  The Navy currently plans to build eight ships.  
(Tortorano, 2005)  
3. Schedule and Cost 
Initially the DD21 was planned to be delivered in 2008, taking four years to 
construct the ship.  The DD(X) is now planned to be delivered in 2012, taking six 
years to construct.  Cost for the fifth DD 21 was aimed to be $750 M in FY 96 
dollars.  The latest estimate is over $3.0 B in FY 2005 dollars.  (Tortorano, 2005) 
 
E. USS CONSTITUTION VS. DD(X) 
1. Introduction 
The problems associated with acquisitioning ships have not changed 
much through the years.  Both ships took longer and cost more to build than 
originally estimated.  The mission for building the ships changed during the 
acquisition.  Congress decides the ship’s mission and acquisition strategy 
instead of the Navy.  But as shown in Table 2 you can clearly see that the 
development of US Navy ships has become much more complicated. 
It is obvious after laying out these facts that the DD(X) is a much more 
complex ship.  A minimum amount of integration was needed on the USS 
Constitution.  The design was completed by one person and was done in a 
reasonably short period of time.  The government oversight was minimal with 
only four men overseeing the ship construction.  But look at the crew size; twice 
as many sailors were needed to operate the Constitution.  Technology has done 
a lot for us in automation and less manual work, but the complexity of having 




 USS CONSTITUTION DD(X) 
No. of designers 1 2000 
Years to develop design 1 10+ 
Amt of government oversight 4 200 
Crew size 245 114 
Number of construction drawings 1 3000+ 
Table 2: USS Constitution vs. DD(X) (after Martin, 1997 and “DD(X),” 2005) 
 
All of these items add up to needing to perform more integration.  As more 
people are involved, the design gets more complicated. As less people are used 
to operate the ship there becomes more interface problems by having more 
automated systems.  Sean Barker’s (2000) definition of integration states: 
“Integration is a complex system of problems, rather than a single complex 
problem.  The first difficulty with any integration project is to get a common 
understanding of which problems are actually being addressed by the project and 
which are not.” (284).  Now we will analyze one system on the USS Constitution 
and the DD(X) to compare the complexity of the design and manpower for 
operability of the system. 
2. Anchor Handling 
All ships have an anchor of some sort. They allow the ship to stay in one 
place.  The anchor must be heavy enough to keep the ship from moving.  The 
USS Constitution carried six anchors and required as many as 180 men on 
anchor duty.  The main bower anchor on the USS Constitution weighed 5304 lbs.  
(See Figure 16)  A capstan (See Figure 17) is used to raise and lower the 
anchors.  Twelve long poles are inserted in the capstan and ropes are used as a 
pulley as the men push the anchor up or down by walking around the capstan.  
See Figure 18 of a picture of the main bower anchor detail.  It required more than 
150 men to raise this anchor.  (“Capstans and Anchors,” 2005) 
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Figure 16.   Main Bower Anchor Dockside (from “Capstans and Anchors,” 2005) 
 
 
Figure 17.   Capstan on Gun Deck (from “Capstans and Anchors,” 2005) 
36 
 
Figure 18.   USS Constitution Anchor Detail (from Martin, 2005, p. 97) 
 
There is little doubt that the system used to raise and lower the anchor on 
the USS Constitution is a design that worked and could be used today, but it is 
both labor and time intensive.  The U.S. Navy is continually trying to lower what 
they term “life cycle cost;” that is the cost associated with operating a ship.  
Sailors are the most expensive part of maintaining a ship; therefore designs that 
reduce the amount of sailors to operate a ship are highly efficient for the U.S. 
Navy.   
DD(X) has one anchor.  The need for multiple anchors diminished with the 
addition of engines on ships.  The DD(X) anchor system is designed as a module 
system.  (See Figure 19)  This means that the whole system can be installed in 
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one piece and tested before it is installed.  It is operated by software and requires 
one sailor to operate the anchor control system only when the anchor needs to 
be raised or lowered.  It is also designed to be completely below the deck.  
Mechanical powered capstans are currently used on U.S. Navy ships to operate 
anchors, but the requirement to be hidden from the enemy from radar prevents 
the use of traditional capstans on the deck.  This is just one example of how the 
DD(X) is changing traditional ship design and operation.  (“DD(X),” 2005) 
 
Figure 19.   DD(X) Module Anchor (from “DD(X),” 2005) 
 
The comparison of the anchor system between the two ships 
demonstrates how the design has gotten much more complex for essentially the 
same task.  With the complexity comes additional benefits, most noticeable the 
number of people it takes to operate the anchor.  On the USS Constitution up to 
180 men were required to raise or lower the anchor.  Only one is needed on the 
DD(X) and it’s not even a full-time job.  With the reduction of personnel comes 
additional design criteria and interfaces with other operating systems.   
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F. CASE STUDIES OF SYSTEMS INTEGRATION: SUCCESS & FAILURE 
The proof that a newly developed system is integrated occurs after 
assembly and into operation.  These two cases studies describe the success and 
failure of two complex systems.   
1. Failure: Apollo 13  
Apollo 13 launched on April 11, 1970 and was to be the third manned 
mission to land on the surface of the moon. On the second day of the trip from 
the earth to the moon, the three astronauts heard and felt a large bang when 
they stirred the oxygen tanks.  During the next few minutes, the crew and the 
ground controllers determined that two of the three fuel cells in the Command 
Service Module had gone dead, and both oxygen tanks were rapidly losing 
pressure. (Howard, 1995)  See Figure 20 for the damaged Apollo spacecraft. 
 
Figure 20.   Apollo 13 Damaged Spacecraft (from “The Apollo 13 Accident,” 
2005) 
 
The engineers at NASA did a fantastic job in bringing the crew safely 
home by recalculating trajectories and burn durations, devising new navigation 
and flight control procedures, and estimating how long critical supplies would 
last.  Working with the crew, they developed ways to use the Lunar Module as a 
"life raft," using its environmental support systems, electrical batteries, and 
engines, to substitute for the lost capability in the Command Module. Four days 
later the crew returned safely to Earth, but they had been forced to abort their 
mission of landing on the moon.  (Howard, 1995) 
39 
After two months of study, the problem was determined to have been a 
rupture of oxygen tank Number 2 in the Service Module. The cause, as astronaut 
James Lovell later wrote, was the result of an "accumulation of human errors and 
technical anomalies," not a single cause.  (“The Apollo 13 Accident,” 2005) 
The oxygen tanks had originally been designed to run off the 28 volt DC 
power of the Command and Service Modules. However, the tanks were designed 
to also run off the 65 volt DC ground power at the Kennedy Space Center. All 
components were upgraded to accept 65 volts except the heater thermostatic 
switches, which were overlooked. These switches were designed to open and 
turn off the heater when the tank temperature reached 80 degrees F.  (“The 
Apollo 13,” 2000) 
The Number 2 oxygen tank used in Apollo 13 had been previously 
installed in Apollo 10.  It had been removed for modification, and in the process 
had been dropped about 2 inches causing noticeable damage. It was repaired 
and installed in Apollo 13. Tests indicated the tank was operating properly, but 
ground crews experienced significant difficulty draining it. But all cognizant 
individuals, including the flight crew, decided it was not a serious problem.  
(“Apollo 13,” 2000) 
During pre-flight testing, tank Number 2 showed irregularities and would 
not empty correctly.  It was decided to use the heater to "boil off" the excess 
oxygen, requiring 8 hours of 65 volt DC power.  Because it had not been 
upgraded to work with 65 volt DC power this may have damaged the 
thermostatically controlled switches on the heater.  Prior to launch, the 
temperature of the whole assembly rose to over 1000 degrees F, causing severe 
damage to the protective Teflon insulation on the electrical wires to the power 
fans in the tank.  (“Apollo 13,” 2000) 
When the power fan activated, 56 hours into the mission, the exposed fan 
wires shorted and the Teflon insulation caught fire. A superabundance of pure 
oxygen fed the fire, and the pressure rose. One oxygen tank burst, the other 
ruptured, and the side of the spacecraft was blown out.  (“Apollo 13,” 2000) 
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NASA's investigation of this accident found no fundamental flaws in the 
Apollo design concept, but it did reveal that they needed to do a better job of 
system integration. They needed to improve their procedures for design review, 
integration of modifications, and treatment of anomalous test data.  With proper 
interfaces developed and used during the design the accident could have been 
avoided.  (“Apollo 13,” 2000) 
2. Success: Boeing 777 
In October 1990, Boeing’s 777 program was launched when United 
Airlines agreed to order the aircraft.  In 1995 Boeing received the Collier Trophy 
for designing, manufacturing, and introducing into service the world’s most 
advance commercial jet.  This was also the year that United Airlines flew their 
first 777 for commercial service.  Since first hitting the market in 1995 Boeing has 
delivered over 4000 777 airplanes.  The success of the aircraft is shown in its 
safety record and number of sales. (“Boeing 777 Program Information,” 2005)  
See Figure 21 for an in-flight view of the 777. 
 
Figure 21.   Boeing 777 (from “Boeing 777 Program Information,” 2005)   
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Boeing attributes its success of the design and manufacture of the 777 to 
several key things that they did differently from any other airplane development 
they had performed before.  (“Boeing 777 Program Information,” 2005)   
a. Design-Build Teams 
Conduit, the program manager of the program, was quoted as 
saying:  “If you go back to the earlier planes that Boeing built, the factory was on 
the bottom floor, and Engineering was on the second floor.  Both Manufacturing 
and Engineering went back and forth.  The entire Design Department was within 
50 feet of each other.” (Sabbagh, 1995, p. 68)  Boeing had ten thousand people 
working on the design of the 777.  That made it impossible for everyone to be 
within 50 feet of each other.  The Design-Build Teams were designed to allow 
“Manufacturing, Tooling, Planning, Engineering, Finance, and Material” to work 
together on the design of specific parts of the aircraft.  (p. 69)   
The teams met twice a week for two hours at a time.  There were 
several logistic problems with this approach.  First, people were members of 
more than one team, so the schedules could not overlap.  Some teams had 
members across the country, so video teleconferencing was used.  Third was 
finding a place to hold the meeting.  The teams used an agenda and kept to the 
items on the agenda and careful notes were taken of the meetings.  Originally 
Boeing had planned for 80 Design-Build Teams and ended up with 250 Design-
Build Teams. (p. 70) 
The Design-Build Teams enabled Boeing to do three things:  
• Get it closer to right the first time before it was manufactured 
• Get it closer to right before it was tested 
• Test more efficiently (p. 70) 
b. On Site Representation of Customers 
The airline customers were brought into the Design-Build Teams if 
there was a specific issue they were interested in.  One example is the fueling 
panel.  United and the other airlines had fueling stands that only reached a 
certain height.  Boeing did not consider this in their design.  So Boeing moved 
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the fuel panel closer to the ground.  “I don’t know what would have happened if 
the airplane showed up at our stations and nobody could reach the fuel panel-
that would have been very embarrassing.” (p. 77)  By including the customer, or 
the user, Boeing managed to avoid design decisions that did not include the 
customer’s needs.   
c. 3-D CAD (CATIA) 
CATIA was used to model every piece of the aircraft before it was 
built.  This allowed a computer mock-up of the airplane to check for interferences 
between different parts of the design.  “Boeing’s decision to use CATIA in 
conjunction with a team concept emerged primarily as a means of cutting costs 
after analysis revealed that the predominant cost drivers were rework on the 
factory floor and down-stream changes.” (Battershell, 1995, 217)  “Every few 
weeks during the main CATIA design phase, a halt was called to all design 
activity, a design freeze.  When this happened, everybody went into the system 
and looked for problems that had arisen because of the interfaces between one 
system or set of parts and another.” (Sabbagh, 1995, p. 75)  By bringing a halt to 
the design activity the interferences can be addressed one by one, not by order 
of precedent, but by which system needs the space.  This allows the best design 
to be utilized, instead of a design that is just doable.  In the past, “engineers were 
still designing when manufacturing began, and they kept making changes as 
problems subsequently came to light on the factory floor, on the flight line, and 
even in the customer’s hands after the plane was delivered.” (Battershell 217) 
d. Simulated Testing of Systems Before Installation 
“New laboratory facilities enabled the various airplane systems to 
be tested together as a single integrated entity in simulated flight conditions -- 
before the first jetliner ever took to the air.” (“Boeing 777 Program Information,” 
2005)  Because of the new systems used on this aircraft Boeing wanted the 
assurance that not only would the systems work, but that they would work 
together.  This was done by simulating the conditions in the aircraft in a 
laboratory setting.  Although this kind of testing does not reduce all interface 
problems, it does reduce the number of errors that would otherwise put the test 
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team and aircraft at risk during flight testing.  By testing the systems together 
before assembly on the aircraft, changes can be made that otherwise would be 
costly if the equipment was already installed.  (“Boeing 777 Program 
Information,” 2005) 
The combination of these four aspects of the design and test phase 
of the 777 program reduced the number of modifications that in the past would 
have been made during manufacturing or at or after delivery.  Just one of those 
design decisions that were made early in the design cycle could have brought 
failure to the entire program.  Integration and design problems were fixed at the 
earliest possible time.  The success of this program is shown in the fact that the 
airplane made delivery on time and the airliners have been able to use the 777 
for 10 years now and are still ordering more.  For this reason the Boeing 777 is a 
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III. INTEGRATION CONCEPTS & IDEAS 
A. INTRODUCTION 
To summarize, at this point we have discussed what integration is, why 
integration is more important now than it has been in the past for shipbuilding, 
and how integration can cause the failure or success of a program.  Based on 
this information and my experience as a shipbuilder, I present my concepts and 
ideas of things to do to reduce shipbuilding integration problems.   
 
B. CONCEPTS AND IDEAS 
1. Integrated Product Teams 
This concept was developed by the Department of Defense from the idea 
of Boeing’s Design-Build Teams.  I have seen the use of the title in my industry, 
but not the concept.  Currently Integrated Product Teams are just the name of 
the organization of a certain engineering specialty.  As example of this is a 
Propulsion Integrated Product Team whose members include only propulsion 
engineers.  Integrated Product Teams should include members from every part 
of the design, manufacture, and test that have anything to do with the specified 
product.  As a general rule of thumb I recommend the following team members 
for any system being developed for a ship: 
• Design engineer 
• Signature engineer 
• Weight engineer 
• Software engineer 
• System engineer 
• Test engineer 
• Arrangement designer 
• Material buyer 
• Craft discipline 




• Cost engineer 
Every Integrated Product may not need every member of this team and some will 
require more.  You must be flexible to assure that the right people are involved. 
To correctly develop Integrated Product Teams the ship should be broken 
down into the major systems that require the involvement of the different 
disciplines.  This can be done based on the current management structure of 
engineering disciplines or craft management, but should reflect systems or 
products of the ship instead of stovepipes in the organization.  I propose the 
following Integrated Product Teams as a minimum: 
• Naval Architecture: The hull form needs to include ship performance 
in the water, but also ship performance for radar signature control. 
• Power:  This includes propulsion and ship’s services. 
• Combat Systems:  Combat Systems are a set of complicated systems 
usually designed by a single source vendor for the shipyard.  The 
interface of these systems requires careful planning for 
arrangement and weight control. 
• Machinery:  Machinery includes all of the equipment required to 
provide ship services to the crew and its associated piping.  
Steering gears, pumps, and HVAC are just a few examples.   
Most of these Integrated Product Teams will need to be further broken 
down into sub-teams of the major Integrated Product Team.  It then becomes the 
responsibility of the major team to make decisions on interfaces between the 
teams and the sub-teams design the actual product.  Empower the sub-teams to 
design to performance and cost constraints by providing them goals or budgets. 
If used correctly Cross Product Teams should not be necessary, because 
they will be members of each of the Integrated Product Teams.  It is a good idea 
to still allow a functional management group to provide training and mentoring to 
the employees involved in the Integrated Product Teams by specialty. 
When the teams are formed and members are chosen, give everyone a 
copy of each teams’ organization chart.  Ensure that all employees understand 
their role and responsibility and who they report to. 
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To use the Integrated Product Team approach you need to provide the 
necessary equipment and space to hold meetings.  Have conference rooms 
available using a first come, first serve method for reservations with projectors, 
smart boards, video teleconferencing, and computers in the conference rooms.  
Encourage the use of video teleconferencing to reduce travel costs and 
employee stress.  Send employees to training on how to hold a meeting and 
require meeting notes and action items to be recorded and tracked.  Provide 
special training to employees working in Integrated Product Teams that use 
video teleconferencing. 
2. Data Collection and Transfer 
After you decide how the organization will be set-up, you should then 
determine how information will be stored and transferred.  These days most 
communication of ideas and drawings are done electronically.  At the beginning 
of the program you need to decide which programs will be used and ensure that 
when and where they interact with other programs the data can be transferred 
and do not change it.  For example, say the whole ship model will use a 3-D CAD 
program such as CATIA.  The structural engineers will need to perform 
calculations of the ship stresses.  If you plan ahead and know before you buy the 
software to perform the stress analysis if it will use a file exported from CATIA the  
structural engineers will not need to re-model the ship to perform their analysis.  
This can save cost and time, but also accuracy as the design matures and new 
analyzes are performed. 
3. Interface Definition 
Within the Integrated Product Teams the team members will realize that it 
is impossible to get everyone involved with the design that they need.  The 
HVAC system, for example, would need inputs from anyone that had a piece of 
equipment that required cooling.  That size of team would be impossible to 
manage.  As a management technique the teams should identify their interfaces.  
That is, which systems they need information from and which ones need 
information from them.  By doing this at the beginning, once the design begins 
they will know and understand who they need to exchange data with. 
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4. Standardize Everything 
All forms, presentations, reports, and tools need to be standardized.  This 
allows the integrated product teams to focus on designing the product, instead of 
how to format a report.  These items should be as easy to use as possible and 
present a clean, professional look.  For example, if you need to access risk on 
your program, everyone should use the same tool and parameters to accurately 
rank a risk item.  The output should be the same so that when the customer 
looks at the data they do not have to relearn how to read the information. 
5. Modeling 
Do as much modeling using computer programs as you can.  The earlier 
that design flaws can be caught in the design cycle, the cheaper they are to 
change.  All of the problems that will be encountered in production can not be 
caught by computer modeling, but the ones that can be caught earlier will save 
you time and money for use on those items that will be missed.   
In setting up your process for modeling determine how interferences will 
be resolved.  By freezing the design for a week or two, all the integrated product 
teams can focus on clearing interferences, one by one, the most optimal way 
possible.  If the design is not frozen, the push will be on finishing the design and 
the interference will be resolved the easiest way possible at the time by the 
designer instead of utilizing the team and finding the best way. 
6. Testing 
There is so much cost involved with testing that if you can simulate a test 
on the computer first then you should do it.  By doing this, you reduce the 
number of things that can go wrong with the test when you perform the physical 
test.  But do not make the mistake of substituting simulation with physical testing.  
Just like with modeling, the computer environment can help with identifying 
potential problems, but a computer simulation can not take in all of the variables 
that occur in real life.   
Test all the systems and their interactions before you install the equipment 
on the ship.  You may not be able to completely simulate the shipboard 
environment, but if you can work out the majority of the bugs in the laboratory 
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instead of aboard ship you will not impact your ship construction schedule and 
the environment will be easier and less costly to work in.   
7. Configuration Management 
Establish a good configuration management process from the beginning of 
the program.  Make sure that all meetings, drawings, reports, are documented 
and under some form of configuration control.  As the design matures tighten up 
the configuration control, but do not operate a single day on your program 
without it.  You must be able to accurately demonstrate the reason for every 
design decision made for your customer or if you have a failure once the system 
is operational.  You should plan how many drawings you will have, not just 
number them as they are developed.  Otherwise the number of drawings will 
spiral out of control and will become hard to manage.  Change to the design 
needs to be managed to assure all parties affected are aware of the change and 
its impact to their design. 
8. Anticipate the Unknown-Unknowns 
There will be problems that no one ever thought about until they see the 
system operating right in front of them.  Realize that this will happen and plan for 
it.  You will not be able to solve the problem if you do not know what it is, but you 
will be able to position the team to anticipate these types of problems and react 
quickly and smartly when they occur. 
 
C. SUMMARY 
By following these eight steps you will have prepared the ship for total 
integration.  Unfortunately there is nothing that can be done to assure success, 
but the omission of one thing can cause failure.  “The weakest link will cause 
your program to fail.” (Marvel, 2004)   
This paper has defined what systems integration means to both the 
customer and the contractor, the reasons that systems integration is more 
important in today’s environment than the earlier years of combat shipbuilding, 
what happens when systems integration is done correctly and not, and finally, 
concepts and ideas gathered from research and experience to help ensure that a 
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newly developed combat shipbuilding program will not fail due to a systems 
integration mistake.  Systems integration is the single most difficult part of 
designing a system because until you use the system it is very hard to determine 
what you are not considering or leaving out of the design.  A combat ship 
operates as a home for the sailors, the soldiers it carries, storage of equipment, a 
war-fighting machine, and so much more.  A combat ship contains so many 
different systems that must be designed to work together that proper systems 
integration is critical for success.  Only by setting up the design teams to openly 
communicate with the builders, testers, and users of the system will integration 
occur as needed to succeed.  Systems integration requires people to be in 
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